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Introduction:  Since  the  1990s  strenuous  attempts  have  been  made  to  rebuild  trust  in  childhood  immunisa-
tions.  This  study  aimed  to  understand  if financial  incentives  (FI)  or  quasi-mandatory  schemes  (QMS),  e.g.
mandating  immunisations  for entry  to universal  services  such  as  day  care  or school,  might  be acceptable
interventions  to increase  immunisations  uptake  for preschool  children.
Material  and methods:  Parents  and carers  of  preschool  children  (n = 91);  health  and  other  professionals
(n  =  18);  and those  responsible  for developing  and  commissioning  immunisation  services  (n =  6)  took  part
in  the study.  Qualitative  methods  were  employed  to explore  the  acceptability  of  FI/QMS  with  stakehol-
ders.  Framework  analysis  was  used  to develop  a coding  framework  that was  applied  to  the  whole  dataset.
Interpretations  of  the  emergent  themes  were  verified  between  researchers  and  presented  to the  project’s
Parent  Reference  Group  to ensure  coherence  and  relevance.
Results:  (1)  FI: parents  and  professionals  felt introducing  FI was  inappropriate.  It was  acknowledged  FI
may encourage  families  living  in  disadvantage  to prioritise  immunisation,  but  unintended  consequences
could  outweigh  any  advantage.  FI  essentially  changes  behaviour  into  a cash  transaction  which  many
equated  to  bribery  that  could  inadvertently  create  inequalities.
(2)  QMS:  parents  and  professionals  highlighted  the positives  of  introducing  QMS, stating  it  felt  natural,
fair  and  less  likely to create  inequality.  Despite  QMS’  potential  to positively  impact  on  uptake  there  were
concerns  about  the implementation  and  workability  of  such  schemes.
Discussion  and  conclusion:  FI for preschool  immunisation  may  not  be acceptable,  within  a  UK  context.
Introducing  FI could  have  detrimental  effects  on uptake  if it  were  associated  with  bribery  and  coercion.
Quasi-mandatory  schemes,  mandating  immunisation  for universal  service  entry,  was  the  most  acceptable
option  and  could  contribute  to  the  normalising  of  immunisation.  Future  work  would  be  needed  to  assess
how  this  could  be successfully  implemented  and  if it did  indeed  increase  uptake.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
Childhood immunisation programmes are a highly effectivePlease cite this article in press as: McNaughton RJ, et al. Acceptability
uptake of immunisations in preschool children in the United Kingdom:
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2016.03.009
ublic health strategy to reduce the incidence of (and the asso-
iated morbidity and mortality from) infectious diseases. The
orld Health Organization has set a target of 90% coverage for all
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immunisations, and 95% coverage for diphtheria and measles, to
achieve herd immunity [1,2]. In the United Kingdom (UK), stren-
uous attempts have been made to rebuild trust in immunisation
since the MMR  debacle of the 1990s when Andrew Wakefield made
false claims about a link between the MMR  vaccine and autism [3,4].
In 2011–2012, MMR  uptake stood at 86% in England (Wales 82.4%)
[5] and, in that period, a number of epidemic ‘flares’ of measles
occurred, 10% of cases involving hospitalisation [6]. Immunisation
coverage rates in England and Wales demonstrate that coverage of financial incentives or quasi-mandatory schemes to increase
 Qualitative study with parents and service delivery staff. Vaccine
for both diphtheria and measles are consistently lower than the
recommended 95% with geographical pockets of low uptake [7],
leaving the potential for herd immunity to be compromised and
the possibility of further epidemic ‘flares’. In the UK,  participation
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Table 1
Characteristics of areas from which focus group participants were drawn.
Focus group
number(s)
Descriptor
1 South of region. Lower deprivation. Lower rates of childhood
vaccination. High incidence of measles 2012–2013
4,  5, 7, 8 South of region. Higher deprivation. Lower rates of childhood
vaccination. High incidence of measles 2012–2013
10  North of region. Lower deprivation. Higher rates of childhood
vaccination. Low incidence of measles 2012–2013
2,  3, 6, 9 North of region. Higher deprivation. Higher rates of childhood
vaccination. Low incidence of measles 2012–2013
Table 2
Number of interviews carried out with health and other professionals.
Professional group Number of interviews
completed
National & regional policy & commissioners 6
GP,  practice nurses & practice managers 9
Health visitors 4
School nurses 1ARTICLEVAC-17437; No. of Pages 8
 R.J. McNaughton et al. 
n the childhood immunisation programme is voluntary and pro-
ided free of charge [8]; however, other countries operate different
ystems such as providing a financial incentive or penalty [9] or
andating immunisation for school entry [10].
Between 2013 and 2015 a 3-phase study was undertaken
hich aimed to examine what level of inducement or penalty
ight be an effective and acceptable way of increasing uptake
f all recommended preschool immunisations in the UK. We
ere interested in the introduction of financial incentive (pro-
iding a cash reward for immunising a child) or quasi-mandatory
chemes (requiring immunisation for entry into universal services
uch as day-care or school). The 3 phases of work included: a
ystematic review of existing research evidence on the effective-
ess, acceptability, cost, and efficiency of financial incentives or
uasi-mandatory schemes for increasing uptake of vaccinations
n preschool children [11]; a qualitative study undertaken with
 range of stakeholders, exploring what is and is not acceptable
bout these schemes and what can be done to improve acceptabil-
ty; a discrete choice experiment exploring the relative preferences
f parents and carers of preschool children for approaches to
elivering vaccination programmes, including financial incentives
nd quasi-mandatory schemes, and the predicted uptake rates of
hese.
This paper reports on the second of these phases. A qualitative
pproach was employed to build upon the results of the system-
tic review [11]. It aimed both to gather and synthesise data about
he views, wants and needs of parents and health and other profes-
ionals in relation to preschool vaccinations, and also to examine
eaction to the hypothetical introduction of financial incentive or
uasi-mandatory schemes.
. Materials and methods
We  sought to include the views of two distinct stakeholder
roups, namely parents and carers of preschool children and also
hose who would either have a role in creating or commission-
ng such policies or who would have to implement them e.g. those
orking in policy, health professionals, teachers, etc.
.1. Sampling
.1.1. Parents
Factors associated with uptake were used to guide purposive
ampling [12,13]. Evidence suggests that those living in areas of
eprivation are less likely to prioritise immunisation and con-
ersely those living in areas of affluence are more likely to be
onscientious objectors of immunisation [14–17]. Therefore we
argeted Children’s Centres serving highly deprived geographical
ocations and breast feeding support/toddler groups serving afflu-
nt geographical locations in a bid to include non or partially
mmunising parents. On advice from our expert steering group
comprising the wider project team, policy and practice partners,
nd academics) we included views of parents resident in geograph-
cal areas of North East England that had and had not experienced
 measles outbreak in 2012/2013. We  hoped to recruit both immu-
isers and partial or non-immunisers and parents from a range of
ocioeconomic groups, however, only one parent identified them-
elves as a partial immuniser.
Eight locations for focus groups were identified to carry out the
eldwork. This included Children’s Centres serving populations liv-Please cite this article in press as: McNaughton RJ, et al. Acceptability
uptake of immunisations in preschool children in the United Kingdom:
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2016.03.009
ng in areas of deprivation (n = 4 groups in a ‘measles outbreak’ area,
 = 4 groups in a ‘no measles outbreak’ area) and two were carried
ut in breastfeeding support/baby and toddler groups which served
 more affluent population (n = 1 ‘measles outbreak’ area, n = 1 ‘no
easles outbreak’ area). See Table 1.Community paediatricians 2
Primary school head teachers 2
2.1.2. Health and other professionals
Participants were identified purposively, and through discus-
sion with key stakeholders, taking into account job role and
current responsibility for developing, commissioning and deliv-
ering vaccination services. This included both strategic level staff
(commissioners; n = 6) and operational level staff (practice nurses,
health visitors, general practitioners; n = 13), but we also extended
the sample to other professional groups (community paediatri-
cians, school nurses and primary school head teachers; n = 5) who
might become involved in delivery if quasi-mandatory schemes
were to be introduced.
2.2. Recruitment
Parents (n = 91 in total in 10 focus groups) were recruited
through Children’s Centres and local breastfeeding support/baby
and toddler groups. Table 1 shows demographic makeup of each
group. Parents were reimbursed for travel costs. Childcare was
organised or reimbursed and a £20 shopping voucher was  provided
to thank participants for their time.
Health and other professionals (n = 24 in total) were recruited
through the professional networks of the wider research team, the
steering group and the North of England Commissioning Support
Unit. A snowball sampling strategy was  also employed, whereby
participants identified other professionals to be contacted. Table 2
shows the number of participants recruited from each stakeholder
group. Participants received written information about the project
and signed a consent form prior to participation.
2.3. Data collection
Work with all participants centred on 6 scenarios derived from
real-world examples identified in the systematic review:
• A universal gift of money upon completion of a full course of
vaccinations for all parents (financial incentive).
• A targeted gift of money for non/partial immunising parents to
bring their child’s vaccinations up to date (financial incentive). of financial incentives or quasi-mandatory schemes to increase
 Qualitative study with parents and service delivery staff. Vaccine
• A cash penalty for those unable to demonstrate a full record of
child vaccination (financial incentive).
• Removal of childcare contributions from those unable to demon-
strate a full record of child vaccination (financial incentive).
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Box 1: Acceptability of financial incentives schemes.
Parent: Some people literally can’t be bothered, which is horrible but . . ..
Parent:  So actually giving them money would get the child there. It’s about the
child at the end of the day, not the means. (Mothers, focus group 3)
Interviewer: You think it might make  it a little bit more attractive to ‘certain’
people?
Parent: To ‘certain’ people.
Parent: If you’re getting £50, yes of course it will. It will make  some people get
off their backside and take them [children] to the doctors. (Mothers, focus group
4)
It  will bring a divide between the rich and the poor, because I can afford not to
[immunise my  child]. (Mother, focus group 1)
There’s people who just can’t be bothered to take their kids to get it done. And
then  they’re the kids that end up catching it [childhood diseases] and it starts
building up as a more common disease again. So to get them to go, I suppose
[financial incentives are a good idea]. But then why should they be rewarded
with money because they couldn’t be bothered to take their kids in the first
place? (Mother, focus group 6)
People would wait longer on purpose to get the vaccinations. And the ones
who’ve done it on time would feel as if they were penalised. (Father, focus
group 5)
I mean at the end of the day. having children and making sure that they’re
vaccinated against all these diseases should not be down to cash . . . I think
they’ve [parents] got a responsibility; they bring these little ones into the world
and  they should look after them as best they can. (Practice Nurse 3)
Parent: I think it’s wrong.
Interviewer: It’s wrong, why is it wrong?
Parent: Well why would you bribe someone to get your kid’s needles
[immunisations] done?
Parent: They should want to.
Parent: It’s your duty to protect your children. (Mothers, focus group 7)
You might get people who come [to have their children immunised] by paying
them, but then not the ones that are just against them [vaccinations], because
some people genuinely believe that they’re no good for them, for their children,
don’t they? (Mother, focus group 4)
The monetary incentive would work for the lower socio economic class and
there are quite a few in that particular class who either just couldn’t be
bothered, because they’ve too many things and their lives are very, not easy,
discordant and lots of other things going on. So for them I think if there was a
monetary incentive it might work in kind of attracting that class of people. But,
as I said, the other class [who have made a conscious decision] is very uniqueARTICLEVAC-17437; No. of Pages 8
R.J. McNaughton et al. 
Entry into preschool, nursery or day-care settings restricted to
those able to demonstrate a full record of child vaccination, or
acceptable reason for exemption (e.g. on religious, moral or med-
ical grounds; quasi-mandatory scheme).
Entry into school restricted to those able to demonstrate a full
record of child vaccination, or acceptable reason for exemption
(e.g. on religious, moral or medical grounds; quasi-mandatory
scheme).
Vignettes were used in the parent focus groups as a method of
enerating discussion. Focus groups and interviews were digitally
ecorded with participant consent and transcribed verbatim. Focus
roup 10 was attended by more parents than expected (n = 23),
ccompanied by 26 babies and toddlers. This group was  broken
nto smaller discussion groups but the tapes were too noisy to tran-
cribe, so, as a result, although this focus group contributed to our
nderstanding, no direct quotes were extracted.
RM,  a full time research associate, carried out the fieldwork with
arents and carers. One other researcher was present during focus
roup discussions to take notes. Both researchers were female and
ad no prior relationships with any of the participants.
.4. Ethical approval and conduct
The research protocol was approved by Teesside University’s
chool of Health and Social Care Research Ethics and Governance
ommittee. The study was adopted to the NIHR portfolio to facili-
ate R&D approval.
.5. Sample size
We  conducted 10 focus groups with parents (n = 91) which
llowed us to reach thematic ‘saturation’ [18]. In addition we  car-
ied out 18 interviews with health and other professionals, and 6
nterviews with policy makers and commissioners. The small num-
er of interviews with the latter group did not allow us to achieve
saturation’. These interviews were, however, designed mainly to
ive implementation context to the main focus on the work with
arents and carers.
.6. Analysis
Framework analysis was used to analyse focus group and
nterview data [12,19]. RM and JS initially read a subset of trans-
ripts to identify recurrent concepts. These were organised into
igher-order categories to provide the thematic framework. The
ramework was applied to the full data set by RM.  The framework
as iteratively refined until a definitive framework was  achieved.
requent discussions took place between RM and JS (as well as the
ider research team) throughout the data analysis phase, to ensure
hat interpretations were credible, valid and shared [13].
A Parent Advisory Group was established to give their views on
he project’s methods and findings. This group comprised of parents
nd carers in one children’s centre site. The results of the Frame-
ork analysis were presented and discussed with these parents to
heck that themes had not been overstated and were representative
f their experiences.
. Results
Data described in the following sections were obtained fromPlease cite this article in press as: McNaughton RJ, et al. Acceptability
uptake of immunisations in preschool children in the United Kingdom:
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2016.03.009
arents, and health and other professionals. First we  present find-
ngs that relate to the introduction of FI, either universally offered
r targeted, based on immunisation status of the child. Secondly,
e explore opinion about introducing quasi-mandatory schemes.and I don’t think monetary incentive would work in them. (Community
Paediatrician 2)
3.1. Acceptability of financial incentives (Box 1)
Introducing financial incentive to encourage uptake of vacci-
nations was  met  with overwhelmingly negative reactions from
parents. There was  some consideration that financial incentive
might help to incentivise parents who had not previously pri-
oritised immunisation and there was  speculation that financial
incentive would mainly be attractive to families living in disadvan-
tage. It was noted that more affluent families would not be likely
to be influenced by a financial incentive in the same way  as less
affluent ones.
Concerns were raised by parents from affluent areas that
introducing financial incentive, regardless of how implemented,
could create a divide between rich and poor. Parents who were
financially stable could still make a conscientious choice about
whether to immunise their child or not, as they could afford to
disregard a financial incentive. This concern became more evident
when parents were presented with scenarios that included a finan-
cial penalty, such as the removal of certain benefits or government
contributions to childcare.
Parents were clear that if a financial incentive was  to be
introduced it would have to be universally offered, thus being
perceived as an equitable offer, regardless of immunisation status of financial incentives or quasi-mandatory schemes to increase
 Qualitative study with parents and service delivery staff. Vaccine
or socioeconomic status of the child. The introduction of financial
incentive might be seen as a way of appearing to reward parents for
socially unacceptable behaviour (i.e. delaying vaccination), espe-
cially if this ‘reward’ was  offered on a targeted basis (i.e. only to
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelJVAC-17437; No. of Pages 8
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Box 2: Workability and governance of financial incen-
tives schemes.
Parent: Well no, they’re [parents] being paid. The vaccinations cost a fortune in
themselves. Every child that’s immunised is getting that . . . in other countries,
people would have to be finding the money to get their children immunised,
wouldn’t they, against illnesses?
Parent: But then that comes back to where are they [the government] going to
find  the money from to pay for this scheme? (Mothers, focus group 3)
Put the money to better use. Build parks for the kids to go and play. Don’t pay a
parent to vaccinate. (Mother, focus group 8)
It’s a big issue if you’re going to give cash, especially in today’s NHS culture of
working smarter and leaner. so we’ve got to look at that. (Commissioner 1)
I  have some experience of looking at financial incentives as a provider. . . .
Incentivising, for example, smoking [cessation] in pregnancy . . . you hit a lot of
financial governance issues around how you track that finance. When you pay it
out,  was it used by that person, what was it used for? So, you know, you might
pay them a fiver [£5] for a vaccination, but are they then spending that fiver on
fags [cigarettes], which is then your public health [issue] . . . We didn’t do it in
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Box 3: Acceptability of quasi-mandatory schemes.
I prefer this idea [quasi-mandatory schemes] to the last one [financial incentive],
I  think it’s more inclusive. And OK, yes fair enough it’s implying that if you don’t
have the vaccinations your child can’t go to the school, but I think it’s probably
fair  from the school’s point of view that they should be able to exclude people
who are at risk of transmitting these diseases through the school. So, in that
respect, I think it is fairer than the other one. (Mother, focus group 1)
Parent: I don’t think the kids should be allowed to come [to childcare setting].
Like I know you can’t, but like visit playgroups or Sure Start Centres or even be
allowed at school nursery if they haven’t been immunised. Because then they
could be carrying something and passing it on to other kids.
Parent: Exactly, I agree with that.
Parent: Do you know what I mean, I don’t think they should be allowed around
any other kids if they haven’t been immunised. (Mothers, focus group 7)
You’re thinking in a sense that that’s protecting your child, by everybody having
their vaccinations, because obviously the infections or diseases will go round
quicker. (Mother, focus group 3)
I  think there is a lot to be said for mandatory requirement, you know, for entry
into a day care or, you know, a preschool setting, be it, you know, for the under
two’s, yes nursery or, yes childcare nursery or educational nursery. And I think
from a population health point of view and protection, and the great and the
good, I think mandatory is something that we should be looking at.
(Commissioner 3)
It should be made, [that] if you need childcare for your child, you’re going in
there with all these children who have already been immunised, if you want
your child in that placement, you need to have your child immunised before it
starts and that’s the rule. And if they don’t have it done, you can’t have the
childcare. (Mother, focus group 8)
I’d be quite happy if they did [mandate]. And I’d be quite happy to know that
they’ve asked the other parents in there, because you’re right, they do pick up
everything at nursery, [Child’s name] gets absolutely everything . . . so it
wouldn’t bother me  to be asked that and I’d probably get more comfort in
knowing that everybody else is being asked that question. (Mother, focus group
4)
Parent: They [unimmunised children] are in contact with all the little babies
that can’t be immunised.
Parent: All the ones that can’t be immunised because they’ve not reached the
right age yet, or just the fact that there are a lot of three year olds and like two
year old, and a baby is a lot more susceptible to complications than older kids.
(Mothers, focus group 6)
I mean some of these adults can catch them can’t they? It’s not just children.
When you were just saying there about a day worker, you know, comes into
your home or whatever, they’re going to go to other people’s houses and
everything. And it’s the same as the nursery teachers, they’re going to go home
to  their own families. (Mother, focus group 5)
Parent: If the nursery turned round and said, you can’t come in unless you get
immunised, that inspires you to go to the doctor’s [surgery], doesn’t it?
Parent: Then it seems like a rule – not just being forced to do it. (Mothers,the  end. (Commissioner 3)
hose whose children were not up-to-date with their vaccinations).
argeting of financial incentive to parents of children who  were not
p-to-date could lead to parents who had fulfilled their ‘obligations’
o immunise their child on time feeling penalised. Parents felt that a
argeted form of financial incentive would lead to unintended con-
equences, in that people would begin to ‘play the system’ and delay
mmunisation to become eligible for the financial incentive, having
etrimental effects on coverage rates. Professionals mirrored this
eeling that financial incentive was distasteful. They held fast to the
elief that immunisation was part of the obligation to be a respon-
ible parent and that the introduction of financial incentive could
rode the notion of parental responsibility to protect the child.
Regardless of the implementation strategy for financial incen-
ive, parents commonly identified financial incentives as a form of
ribery. Parents were resolute that financial reward should not be a
actor when making a decision to immunise their child. All parties
nterviewed felt that financial incentives would be ineffective at
ncentivising parents who had made an informed and conscien-
ious choice not to immunise their child, these parents being noted
s particularly unwavering in their beliefs.
.2. Workability and governance of financial incentives schemes
Box 2)
There were concerns that, in a time of austerity, when many
ublic budgets are being cut, public services are under threat, and
udgets being closely and publically scrutinised, the introduction
f financial incentives would be an inappropriate use of resources.
t was noted that immunisations are already offered free of charge
o all children, at a cost to the UK NHS, and this offer in itself should
e sufficient to incentivise parents to immunise their children. Par-
nts stated that they would prefer to see public funds used in ways
hat could improve the quality of life for children in sustainable
ays. Indeed, whilst parents believed that any financial incen-
ive scheme should be offered universally, they raised concerns
hat money would then be needlessly spent incentivising parents
ho would have immunised their children without the need for
n incentive. Experience of using financial incentive to encourage
ther health-related behaviours led to concerns amongst imple-
entation staff about how financial incentive would be spent by
arents. To avoid financial incentive being used to engage in neg-
tive health behaviours (tobacco use, alcohol consumption or poorPlease cite this article in press as: McNaughton RJ, et al. Acceptability
uptake of immunisations in preschool children in the United Kingdom:
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2016.03.009
ietary choices), it was felt better to provide vouchers which could
nly be spent in approved establishments. However, experience
howed that, even then, these could be sold or exchanged for inap-
ropriate products.focus group 2)
3.3. Acceptability of quasi-mandatory schemes (Box 3)
Unlike their reactions to the introduction of financial incen-
tive, parents could see many advantages to the introduction of
quasi-mandatory schemes, with those being preferable to finan-
cial incentive. Parents saw quasi-mandatory schemes as fairer and
more equitable. There was  general agreement that unimmunised
children should be excluded from interacting with other children in
settings such as day-care or school since they pose an infection risk
to other children in the shared environment. By their very nature,
day-care settings provide an ideal environment for the transmis-
sion of infectious diseases (communal toys/crawling children) and
for this reason it was preferable to mandate immunisation for entry.
It was felt that introducing a quasi-mandatory scheme would facil-
itate the normalising of immunisation behaviour, meaning that, if
immunisation was  just a routine requirement for entry, parents
would accept it as ‘just the way  it is’.
It was  felt that mandating immunisation for entry into child- of financial incentives or quasi-mandatory schemes to increase
 Qualitative study with parents and service delivery staff. Vaccine
care or education services would provide peace of mind for all
parents that the likelihood of their child contracting an infection
was reduced, through the protection afforded by herd immunity,
especially for those children who  were not old enough to receive
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelJVAC-17437; No. of Pages 8
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Box 4: Autonomy and democratic rights.
Parent: Surely you’d want your child to have the best education. You don’t want
them to miss out on that year, just because you haven’t had your vaccination.
Parent: It’s not just an education, it’s a social life. You’d want them to socialise,
wouldn’t you really. (Mothers, focus group 7)
Lots of children could be affected by that, couldn’t they? It’s the parent making
the decision that a child can’t make.  [Child’s name] can’t make a decision as to
whether she gets her vaccinations or not; that’s something that I have to make.
She  doesn’t have that choice. So if I just don’t give her them, then I’m affecting
her  future aren’t I? Whether she goes to school to get educated or I educate her
at  home, and it won’t be nowhere near the standard as a school would. You
don’t have time to educate the child at home. (Mother, focus group 4)
You can’t really reprimand some parents for not taking their children in and say,
well  you’ll be facing imprisonment if they don’t go to school, and then say, but
if  they’re not immunised they’re not allowed to go to school. So then, do they
face imprisonment for their child not going to school because they’re not
immunised? (Mother, focus group 6)
That’s not actually how our country works. And as much as I’ve got my  child
immunised, and I believe in vaccination, I don’t think you can start telling
people they don’t have the choice. (Mother, focus group 3)
The ethical aspect, the morality of it . . . It’s like, you know, making a nanny kind
of  a state. We are a democratic county and, you know, everybody’s beliefs and
opinions are kind of respected. But then we are sort of saying; your child is not
going to have an education if you don’t immunise. (General Practitioner 3)
In  a way I think that’s nonsense because, for a lot of our families we would want
mandatory nursery places for [them], our harder to reach families, where there
is  social need. So if we’re saying they potentially might be the ones that are
highest non-uptake of vaccinations, that becomes a nonsense. Because the
thought beyond that then is, you’re excluding the excluded . . . And quite often
we want them in nursery because that allows parents maybe to access some
parenting courses . . . then if we’re to exclude those from nursery because
they’re not up to date with their vaccinations, that’s a nonsense to me
unfortunately. (Health Visitor 2)
I  still think there’d be people who would say, well I’ll home school or I’ll send my
children to this special homeopathic school down the road because I can afford
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Box 5: Workability of quasi-mandatory schemes.
Who  polices that then [identification of unimmunised child]? Say, for instance,
we accept children into our nursery or into school, we notice they haven’t been
immunised . . . it’s then office time or our parent support advisor who will be
doing that chasing up I’d think. And I don’t think that’s a school responsibility.
Again, that’s a parent responsibility, or health professional’s responsibility.
(Head Teacher 2)
If a parent wants a child [to get] into nursery, [and] their policy is your child
must  be up to date with vaccinations and you must have evidence of that
[vaccination record]. What the evidence is, is another matter. You know, who
can  scrutinise a Red Book [child health record, held by parent]? Who  can read a
list  of vaccinations? Does it need to be a health professional reading it? Can you
train  somebody in the nursery group to do that? So, there’s those issues to
consider as well. (Commissioner 1)
To share the child’s information, we  wouldn’t just be able to, you know, County
Hall wouldn’t just be able to say, we need vaccination histories on these thirty
children. We  would, you know [have to get consent], and that consent thing
would be the time consuming thing and . . . the practice shouldn’t beto  pay. I can get out of this, it doesn’t apply to me.  (Mother, focus group 1)
mmunisation themselves. This idea of protecting the wider com-
unity of unimmunised or partially immunised people extended
o staff working within the setting and families of all those who
ttend it. The introduction of quasi-mandatory schemes was iden-
ified as a way of encouraging those parents who had, for whatever
eason, not prioritised immunisation to do so.
.4. Autonomy and democratic rights (Box 4)
It did not pass unnoticed in this discussion that a child’s rights
o socialise and be educated should also be respected. In the view
f many of the participants, the threat that a child would be denied
hese activities, based on incomplete immunisation status, should
e a motivating factor to engage with the childhood immunisation
rogramme. This was especially relevant when it came to school
ntry. However, conversely, parents felt that refusing entry to day-
are or school would ultimately punish the child, rather than the
arent, and jeopardise the child’s future because of a faulty choice
ade by their parent. Parents also expressed concerns about the
ossibility of being prosecuted if their child was unable to attend
chool as a consequence of an immunisation decision as under cur-
ent legislation parents can be prosecuted for taking their child out
f school during term time in the UK.
There was concern that introducing quasi-mandatory schemes
ould be interpreted as a removal of parental choice, which par-
nts felt was one of their rights as a parent living in a democratic
ociety. Professionals wrestled with the potential ethical implica-
ions of introducing quasi-mandatory schemes and it was felt thatPlease cite this article in press as: McNaughton RJ, et al. Acceptability
uptake of immunisations in preschool children in the United Kingdom:
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2016.03.009
uch a scheme could undermine the work they did with families
o engage them with services, ensure informed choice, promote
etter outcomes and that it might, essentially, be contrary to their
rofessional ethos. Even the implementation of a quasi-mandatoryresponsible for getting the consent. (Practice Manager)
schemes would not ensure 100% coverage rates in preschool chil-
dren as some parents, with the resources to do so, could opt their
children out of state education and home-school them or pay for
private education or day-care. Similarly, there would be some par-
ents who  opted out due to medical reasons. Again, it was  noted that
this would produce inequalities in the ability to make an informed
decision.
3.5. Workability of quasi-mandatory schemes (Box 5)
Whilst it was believed that quasi-mandatory schemes might
positively affect rates of immunisation, there were clearly concerns
raised about both the ethics and the practicalities of such schemes
in a UK setting. Head teachers were resolute that, if introduced,
responsibility for administering quasi-mandatory schemes should
not fall on them and they felt that the responsibility for this lay
directly with the health sector. The process of identifying unimmu-
nised children would be burdensome for schools’ administrative
systems and would require specialist knowledge and training to
interpret the immunisation status of the child.
In the UK, parents have a personal health record containing their
child’s immunisation history, and there were concerns if this alone
were to be used as proof of immunisation. Such record books are
often lost or not up-to-date. It was  highlighted by those in general
practice that the sharing of personal data about a child’s immun-
isation history between the health sector and other organisations,
such as schools, could be problematic if schools became responsible
for effectively ‘policing’ any quasi-mandatory schemes.
4. Discussion
Almost all participants in this study felt that the offer of finan-
cial incentive was inappropriate in the context of immunisation. A
universal incentive was  seen as a waste of resources, rewarding
people for behaviours that the vast majority undertake without
an inducement. There was some feeling that those families liv-
ing in deprivation would be more open to the offer of financial
incentive and that targeted incentives might encourage the priori-
tisation of immunisation amongst people who  were insufficiently
motivated otherwise. However, it was felt that any such targeted
benefit could be outweighed by the unintended consequences of
introducing financial incentive. In this respect the first concern is of financial incentives or quasi-mandatory schemes to increase
 Qualitative study with parents and service delivery staff. Vaccine
that it might be construed that the incentives were a form of bribery
designed to overcome resistance to immunisation, stoking the fires
of those who  feel anxious about the safety of vaccines. The second
unintended consequence could be the monetisation of a behaviour
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sually seen as an act of good parenting and social responsi-
ility. It was feared that breaking down these bonds of social
esponsibility would lead to parents playing the system. Concerns
ere surfaced that introducing financial incentive would create
urther inequality between parents from differing socioeconomic
ackgrounds. Whilst financial incentive may  be attractive to fam-
lies living in disadvantage, those parents who had the resources
nd power to not ‘need’ a financial incentive would remain able
o make decisions about vaccination based on their personal
eliefs. Financial disincentives or penalties were seen as ‘fairer’,
nd without the risks of associating immunisation with bribery
though one could argue that this degree of compulsion would
ave the same effect of inducing mistrust) and of monetising social
ehaviours.
Far more acceptable to participants was the notion of quasi-
andatory measures, principally barring entrance to preschool
r school facilities unless a parent can demonstrate a complete
mmunisation record. There may  be differences in acceptability
f mandating entry to day-care rather than school, however in
ur systematic review of the literature [11] and the Briss, Rode-
ald [20] review there was an absence of evidence to suggest if or
hy this may  be the case. Parents in particular, with their expe-
ience of their children’s minor illnesses, noted that such settings
ere hotbeds for the transmission of infections, so that there was
omething natural about immunisation status being checked and
n association with the need to maintain herd immunity at that
oint. That said, there was a feeling amongst parents that children
ad an entitlement to their education placements, and that they
hould not be made to suffer by parents who made a choice not
o immunise on their behalf, either from personal beliefs or from
ecklessness or fear. Some professionals were even more adamant
hat it was precisely the children of the most disadvantaged who
enefited most from educational and play opportunities and that
hey were the last group in which one would wish to place an
xtra barrier to educational participation. At the end of the day
t was felt that, in a democratic society, parents do have the right
o choose whether or not to vaccinate their child and that there
ould always have to be a clause allowing conscientious objec-
ors to withhold their child from the immunisation programme,
o long as it was made absolutely clear to them what the risks
ere.
The workability of any such system of quasi-mandates was  also
uestioned by professionals. Education staff were very reluctant
o become responsible for ‘policing’ the health status of children
t school or playgroup entry. Health professionals raised practical
oncerns about the recording and constant updating of immun-
sation status, as well as the sharing of confidential information
ith non-medical staff. Both parents and health professionals
elieved that there was a need to strengthen existing patterns of
elivery of immunisation before such drastic measures as either
nancial incentive or quasi-mandatory schemes were brought in.
uggestions arising from parents focused around wider opportuni-
ies for immunisation through using more family-centred venues
uch as Children’s Centres or community pharmacies. Profession-
ls too noted many missed opportunities for both health promotion
ctivity and opportunistic vaccination which promoted in national
uidance [17]. Multicomponent interventions to improve uptake
f immunisations that include health promotion and education
ave also been found to be effective [20,21]. The lack of a single
accination recording system, accessible across multiple sites, was
ighlighted as a barrier to this. Many professionals who came into
ontact with families felt they would be happy to promote vacci-Please cite this article in press as: McNaughton RJ, et al. Acceptability
uptake of immunisations in preschool children in the United Kingdom:
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2016.03.009
ation to families and in many cases would be happy to deliver the
accination, should they be confident that the child had not already
eceived it. Of course, there are issues around the availability and
afe storage of the vaccines, complexity of the vaccination schedule PRESS
ne xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
and being trained and competent to deliver the injection. However,
there was a distinct feeling that opportunities for vaccinations were
regularly missed.
Head teachers were reluctant to police quasi-mandatory
schemes, but did, however, acknowledge that schools offered
opportunities to promote child health, and even deliver vaccina-
tions. For example, parents often attend an open day in the summer
before the child enters full time education. School nursing teams
could attend these events to discuss the importance of being fully
immunised before school entry and even offer vaccination.
Financial incentives have been found to be effective in some
circumstances to encourage health related behaviours [22–26]
and the suggestion has been made that they may  be more
effective in encouraging one-off, short-term behaviours like vac-
cination, than improving sustained behaviour change over a long
period, such as that required for weight loss and weight main-
tenance [27–31]. However, in the UK in particular, childhood
vaccination has (because of well-rehearsed historical incidents)
[32] become a heavily contested area that must be carefully
negotiated.
Studies have shown the benefit of introducing a financial penalty
for non-vaccination of preschool children [33,34] and this scenario
was deemed the most acceptable of the financial incentives dis-
cussed in this study also. Health professionals did suggest that
incentives that were not cash, for example shopping vouchers,
might be more acceptable, whilst still having the potential to
increase vaccination. Contradictory results have been reported
in relation to financial incentives for other healthy behaviours.
A review of the acceptability of financial incentives for healthy
behaviours such as smoking cessation, weight loss, vaccination
and screening (adults), physical activity, reduced alcohol consump-
tion and safe sun exposure suggested financial incentives to be
acceptable [35]. However, Promberger et al. [36] found accept-
ability for financial incentives for health related behaviours to be
low. Governance and ethical issues were raised about the poten-
tial for vouchers to be used to facilitate unhealthy behaviours,
such as buying alcohol or cigarettes, which would sit in contrast
to the work being undertaken to promote healthy behaviours gen-
erally, these concerns mirror evidence about introducing financial
incentives in other settings [37]. Findings from both stakeholder
groups provide strong support for previous research that describes
health promoting incentives as coercive and divisive [38,39], even
though by their very nature quasi-mandatory schemes are coer-
cive they were not discussed in this way  by the stakeholders in this
study.
Our results support findings from US studies and the current
systematic review around the acceptability of quasi-mandatory
schemes for increasing uptake of vaccination [11], suggesting that
the introduction of such schemes, with the inclusion of an opt out
system, would be acceptable to parents and professionals and could
encourage the normalisation of vaccination, whilst being equitable
for parents across the socioeconomic spectrum. Possible barriers
to implementation have been highlighted earlier in terms of record
sharing and school’s reluctance to administrate or ‘police’ child-
hood immunisations, in the US mandated schemes are in place
but are rarely enforced [40,41]. However this approach, making
immunisation compulsory for entry into education, may  not neces-
sarily require dedicated and sustained input from schools. Schools
are used as a site to deliver several immunisations in the UK [42,43]
so the idea of using the school as a site for immunisation is not new
though this approach is not without its objections [44]. In England,
the height and weight of all reception children (aged 4–5 years) of financial incentives or quasi-mandatory schemes to increase
 Qualitative study with parents and service delivery staff. Vaccine
is collected by school nurses for the National Childhood Measure-
ment Programme [45], and sight and hearing tests are conducted in
those same age groups [46] it is not outwith the realms of possibility
that immunisation status be collected and supported by a catch-up
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rogramme for those children who have just entered mainstream
ducation.
.1. Strengths and limitations
This qualitative study strengthens evidence about the likely
eaction to the introduction of both financial incentives and
uasi-mandatory schemes designed to increase the uptake of vacci-
ations for preschool children within a UK context. Representation
rom key stakeholder groups was included which allowed for tri-
ngulation of findings [47] across stakeholder groups.
However, low representation from partial and non-immunising
arents within the parent sample does pose a limitation to the
xtent our findings can be inferred to that population of parents
12]. These views are largely absent from the analysis and future
ork should prioritise their inclusion. The number of interviews
ith health and other professionals was small and intended to
rovide implementation context to the work with parents and
arers, which was the main focus, rather than be representative
f that population [12]. However, If financial incentives or quasi-
andatory schemes were to be implemented further work with
hese groups would be essential to establish the workability of such
chemes.
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